Introduction
The welcome emphasis on quality and safety in healthcare has fostered greater awareness of the impact of healthcare-acquired infections (HAI). The complexity of medical care, profligate overuse of antimicrobials and the high prevalence of multi-drug-resistant organisms (MRO), transmissible through healthcare workers (HCW) or the hospital environment, has led to a focus on improved infection management and prevention.
In Australia, it is estimated that 200 000 HAI occur annually, of which 50% are preventable.
1,2 HAI, including Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) and catheterassociated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), affect 6-10% of hospitalised patients and result in 7000 deaths in Australian hospitals per year.
1 Two million hospital bed days are lost to HAI annually, at an estimated cost of over $1 billion. 1 In addition, there are significant unmeasured physical, psychological and financial costs to patients and communities.
The main drivers of HAI are suboptimal infection control practices and excessive antimicrobial use. Long term, reduction in HAI rates is contingent on the implementation of multi-modal prevention strategies which require behavioural and cultural change. Core components of such strategies include the identification of MRO carriers, elimination of environmental reservoirs, measures to interrupt cross-transmission and evidence-based antimicrobial use. These measures need to be implemented within a framework of individual responsibility, strong administrative support, and access to up-to-date national and local surveillance data.
2 Table 1 summarises common HAI and outlines preventive strategies. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] In this review, we have focused on the illustrative problems of carbapenem resistance and CDI, and on Infection Control and Antimicrobial Stewardship (AMS), areas where further practice change can be anticipated to reduce HAI rates.
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE)
In the 1990s, extended spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) enzymes, coding for then rare third generation cephalosporin resistance emerged in Enterobacteriaceae, particularly in Escherichia coli and Klebsiella species. Currently, in Australia, 11% of all E. coli bacteraemias and many urinary tract isolates, especially in residents of long-term care facilities, harbour ESBL and hence are resistant to ceftriaxone. 17 The more recent concern is the emergence and global spread of CPE. These bacteria possess enzymes that hydrolyse the majority of β-lactam and other antibiotics, leading to potentially untreatable infections. Globally, transmission occurs rapidly through human and animal populations, and at hospital levels through delayed recognition and breakdowns in infection control. Internationally, mortality rates of up to 40% have been reported for bacteraemias involving specific CPE, such as Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) and New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase. 18 Dissemination is increased by evolution of 'high risk clones', characterised by high rates of colonisation, invasive disease and transmissibility in healthcare settings.
To date, the experience of CPE in Australia has been of sporadic incursions rather than endemicity, however, this may be changing. In 2014, carbapenemases were identified in 0.24% of bacteraemias from Australian patients, and frequently related to overseas travel or to healthcare. 17 The delayed recognition of KPC cases in a Victorian hospital in 2012, largely in an aged-care setting, led to sustained hospital cases over >24 months and secondary cases presenting to other hospitals. 19 Such outbreaks locally and internationally have prompted the development of guidelines for CPE detection and containment. [20] [21] [22] Active surveillance, detection and early intervention
Patients colonised with CPE are usually asymptomatic and when unrecognised can contaminate the hospital environment. Person-to-person transmission through HCW is considered the main route of transmission, however, the role of the environment in MRO transmission is being increasingly recognised (see hospital cleaning below).
Implementation of rectal screening and isolation measures are more effective if there are reliable systems to enable the early identification of patients at risk for CPE exposure. Risk factors include contact with CPE colonised or infected patients, and travellers hospitalised overseas. Other criteria for screening depend on local CPE epidemiology and may include arrival from high incidence regions and admission to high acuity wards. Once hospital transmission of CPE is recognised, broader patient and environmental testing as well as timely and effective hospital and inter-hospital communication strategies are required. This underlines the value of well integrated and supported infection control teams. The Australian CPE guidelines have recently been updated. 20 The variance in published CPE guidelines [20] [21] [22] illustrates the uncertainty in screening criteria and, highlights a deficiency in Australia, where there is a lack of a national antimicrobial resistance management body to • Hand washing.
• Use barrier precautions (gloves, gown, mask) during insertion.
• Clean the skin with chlorhexidine.
• Avoid the femoral site if possible.
• Remove unnecessary catheters.
• Maintenance of line (sterile access, daily review of site, chlorhexidine body wash). 3, 4 Catheter-associated urinary tract infection (CAUTI) • Catheters inserted only for appropriate indications and left in place only while needed.
• Ensure all staff trained in the insertion and maintenance of catheters.
• Insert catheters using aseptic technique and sterile equipment.
• Maintain unobstructed urine flow and a closed drainage system. • Implement bundles and quality improvement programs to ensure appropriate use of catheters. 5, 6 Surgical site infection (SSI) Rates of SSI vary depending on the type of surgery, with overall rates of 2-5% for inpatient surgery. Up to 60% of SSI are preventable. 7 Rates of SSI for elective clean procedures have shown decreased rates in Australia in recent years.
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• Decolonisation for MRSA and MSSA in patients undergoing high risk procedures, including prosthetic cardiothoracic and orthopaedic surgery.
• All patients should bathe or shower prior to surgery.
• Surgical hand preparation using antimicrobial soap and water or alcohol-based hand rub.
• Avoid shaving patients and use chlorhexidine alcohol-based antiseptic solutions to prepare skin.
• Optimise route, dose and timing for surgical prophylaxis (when indicated). Antibiotics not to continue post-operatively to prevent infection, including in the presence of surgical drains.
• Limit operating room traffic to essential movement only. 9 Hospital-acquired pneumonia (HAP) Defined as the onset of pneumonia ≥48 h after admission to hospital in nonventilated patients. Incident rates of 5-20/ 1000 hospital admissions with highest rates in the elderly, immunocompromised, those receiving enteral feeding through a nasogastric tube.
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• Ensure good oral care.
• Early mobilisation of patients.
• Recognition and management of dysphagia.
• Avoid nosocomial cross-transmission of influenza.
Ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) Approximately 10% of endotracheal intubated patients will develop VAP with the risk increasing with the duration of intubation. The estimated mortality of VAP is 1-1.5%, with those who survive requiring longer ventilation, longer ICU and hospital stays.
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• Use non-invasive positive pressure ventilation to avoid intubation or facilitate early extubation.
• Daily interruption of sedation.
• Maintain patients' oral hygiene, including with the use of chlorhexidine.
• Maintain intubated patients in a semirecumbent position when possible (head elevated between 30 -45 ).
• Avoid unnecessary manipulation of ventilator circuits, only change when malfunctioning or visibly soiled.
• Avoid proton pump inhibitors and other agents that raise gastric pH.
enhance co-ordination and to maintain consistency. Additionally, as new carbapenemase enzymes are identified, it is important that the quality of Microbiology practices is regularly updated and reviewed across private and public sectors.
The environmental reservoir
Enterobacteriaceae, including CPE and those harbouring ESBL, can survive in biofilms within hospital drains, toilets and on equipment and other environmental niches which are difficult to access and clean. Bacteria resident in biofilm require up to 1000-fold higher disinfectant concentrations to be eradicated. 23 Protracted outbreaks are well described and when a CPE environmental source is suspected, an intensive search and destroy approach is needed. Occasionally, engineering solutions, including toilet, sink or drain removal are necessary. 19 CPE infection outbreaks have been linked to failures in decontamination of reusable items, including endoscopes. 24 These failures highlight the importance of quality control measures for disinfection procedures and investment in the training of cleaning personnel.
Multi-modal prevention strategies
CPE are acquired in the nosocomial setting through cross-transmission and therefore, hand and environmental hygiene are primary prevention strategies. When CPE are recognised, environmental control should be intensified; patient surrounds should be cleaned and disinfected twice daily, dedicated equipment should be used, and unnecessary transfers avoided. HCW, patients and visitors should be educated regarding the importance of 
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• Avoid unnecessary antibiotic exposure and minimise antibiotic duration.
• Immediately implement contact precautions (using gloves and gowns) for patients with diarrhoea, ensure dedicated bathroom.
• Hand hygiene using soap and water to physically remove spores on soiled hands.
• Rapid diagnostics to facilitate early diagnosis and treatment.
• Hospital room cleaning performed daily.
• Use of a neutral detergent and water followed by disinfection with hypochlorite solution. Hospital onset Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia (HO-SAB)
The annual incidence of HO-SAB has decreased by 63% over the last 12 years. 13 In the most recent year there were 1440 cases (0.73 per 10 000 bed days), 19% of which were MRSA. 14 All-cause mortality for SAB in Australia is approximately 20%.
• Hand hygiene practice promoted and monitored.
• Each SAB is investigated to assess for preventative factors.
• Ensure quality systems for PIVC insertion.
• Regular review of peripherally inserted cannula sites, with routine removal at 72 h in adults.
• Implement environmental cleaning strategy focusing on high touch areas.
Hospital-acquired respiratory tract viruses
The morbidity and mortality of hospitalacquired respiratory tract infection, particularly due to influenza, is well described. 15 A recent study detected viruses in 22% of patients diagnosed with hospital-acquired pneumonia. 16 • Administration of influenza vaccine to staff and vulnerable hospital clients.
• Segregation of patients with influenza like illness at time of triage.
• Adherence to droplet precautions for symptomatic patients (gloves, gown and mask).
• Avoid aerosol generating procedures, including nebulised medications.
• Manage unwell healthcare workers.
• Facilitate early screening and treatment of influenza cases.
MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; MSSA, methicillin-sensitive Staphylococcus aureus; PIVC, peripherally inserted venous catheter; SAB, Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia.
stringent hand hygiene, especially after toileting. AMS initiatives to optimise the use of antibiotics and reduce the selective pressure on resistant Gram-negative organisms are additional key elements of CPE control (see AMS below). Once established, Australian outbreaks of CPE have and will prove difficult, time consuming and expensive to eradicate. 19 Although regulations, as proposed in guidelines, are expensive, the cost of outbreak control following local spread is substantially higher. For example, a KPC outbreak in the UK involving 40 patients over three sites cost over $AUD 1.5 million to control. 25 If solutions to prevent CPE nosocomial infection are to be found, they relate to the early recognition and containment of CPE spread through integrated surveillance, optimised cleaning, and a collective drive to regulate and minimise inappropriate antibiotic use.
Clostridium difficile infection
CDI is one of the most common HAI in Australia, with an annual incidence of 3.65 per 10 000 bed days and an attributable mortality rate of 6-7% at 30 days. 26, 27 The profile of CDI has increased in prominence in recent decades. Between 1999 and 2003 a hypervirulent strain of C. difficile (ribotype 027), with significant morbidity among older people, became endemic in hospitals in North America and the UK. Factors in its emergence were poor antibiotic prescribing practices, particularly for fluoroquinolones, and inadequate environmental and hand hygiene, deficiencies also common in Australian healthcare. Complicating the epidemiology, it is estimated that up to a third of new CDI cases are community onset; 26, 27 only 35% of inpatient CDI were linked to other hospital cases when investigated with whole genome sequencing. 28 
Environmental control
Viable spores are isolated from 49% of surfaces surrounding patients with CDI, including high-touch sites, such as call buttons and bed rails, reflecting the ability of C. difficile to resist desiccation and survive on hard surfaces. 29 Factors including aerosolisation of spores after flushing of toilets, and shedding from asymptomatic carriers, further contribute to environmental contamination. 30 Patients admitted to a room previously occupied by patients with C. difficile have an increased risk of acquiring CDI despite adequate cleaning. 29 For asymptomatic carriers, viable C. difficile spores contaminate 29% of surrounding surfaces; whether bleach cleaning and contact precautions should be standard for such cases is unclear. 29 Pre-emptive isolation of symptomatic patients, supported by rapid diagnostics and enhanced terminal cleaning with disinfectants, such as sodium hypochlorite, are key aspects of infection prevention. C. difficile spores resist standard hospital decontamination methods, including alcohol hand rubs and routine disinfectants (quaternary ammonium compounds (QATS)). To minimise transmission, care bundles should include contact precautions, dedicated patient equipment, regular and terminal bleach cleaning, and hand hygiene using soap and water. 26, 29 Education programmes for HCW and cleaning staff should reinforce the rationale behind C. difficile control measures.
CDI diagnostic tests have limitations. Enzyme immunoassays detecting toxin B production are insufficiently sensitive and underestimate CDI incidence when used as stand-alone tests. Conversely, PCR testing for tcdB (toxin B gene), while identifying symptomatic cases, may reveal a high prevalence of asymptomatic carriage. In a high prevalence setting, testing asymptomatic carriers at admission may reduce new colonisation and hospital CDI cases. Admission screening is not a currently deployed strategy, and would be costly and difficult to implement. 31 However, if a dominant hypervirulent strain, with high morbidity or mortality were to emerge, changed screening paradigms may be justified.
Antibiotic use and active C. difficile infection
Reduced antibiotic exposure, especially to broad-spectrum antibiotics, and limiting the duration of antibiotic use, are the most readily modifiable risk factors in reducing hospital CDI rates. 32 Reductions in third generation cephalosporin use have resulted in reductions in hospital CDI, and institutional C. difficile rates provide a useful outcome measure for the effectiveness of local AMS. 33 For individual patients, persistent antibiotic use increases the risk of subsequent CDI recurrences. 34 A seven-to ten-fold increased risk of recurrent CDI is reported in the first month following antibiotic cessation and a three-fold increased risk is sustained for a further 2 months. 34 An additive risk is conferred by the cumulative exposure to larger doses and longer durations. 32 The impact of antibiotic exposure extends beyond the immediate antibiotic recipient; the risk of CDI is increased at room, ward, hospital and regional levels.
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Hospital cleaning
Environmental cleaning and disinfection are key components of infection control programmes and ensure rooms and equipment are safe for patients. Whereas hand hygiene, appropriately, has received due attention, hospital cleaning has frequently been put into the 'too hard basket' and under-resourced. Until recently the environment's role as a point source in transmission of MRO was underestimated. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus spp. (VRE), Acinetobacter baumannii and C. difficile can persist on dry surfaces for up to 4-5 months. 23, 36 Patients admitted to rooms previously occupied by VRE or MRSA carriers have a two-to three-fold increased risk of acquisition, and similar rates are seen for A. baumannii, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and, as discussed above, C. difficile.
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Molecular typing of MRO outbreaks has linked the environment, hands of HCW, and patient isolates. HCW may have a primary role in spread, but they can acquire MRO from the environment or inadequately cleaned equipment, including monitors, blood pressure cuffs and tourniquets. 39 Use of enhanced methods for terminal cleaning of MRO rooms has been shown to reduce MRSA, VRE and C. difficile acquisition rates. 40 
Cleaning methods
There is no gold standard for acceptable disinfection and approaches vary immensely. Physical cleaning and attention to detailed room coverage, particularly high touch surfaces, remain the most important variables. Cleaning must ensure removal rather than mere shift of microorganisms, and avoidance of wipe or bucket re-contamination. 41 Such measures require staff education. Traditionally QATS are used in routine cleaning, but recent studies question their efficacy in removal of the bioburden of MRO. 42 Bleach is more effective in C. difficile and VRE terminal cleans 43 but can be caustic to surfaces and elicits HCW sensitivity. Several proprietary antiseptic wipes are increasingly used for surface cleaning and to decontaminate equipment with good outcomes and greater staff acceptability.
Enhanced technologies have recently become available. Automated no touch equipment, including ultraviolet light devices (UV) and hydrogen peroxide vapour (HPV), permeate widely to inactivate bacteria and can obviate the dependence on surface cleaning and cleaners' access to surfaces. 44, 45 Patients admitted to rooms after HPV were 64% less likely to acquire an MRO and 80% less likely to acquire VRE. 44 HPV has also been used in C. difficile and MRSA outbreaks, and may have a role in norovirus infection. 38, 46 The addition of UV to standard cleaning reduced VRE rates by 31%. 42 However, both systems are expensive, require trained staff, and are adjuncts to standard physical cleaning. HPV is aerosolised into an empty sealed room to avoid toxicity and results in delayed turnover of up to 4 h, affecting patient movement. While the role of no-touch techniques requires further evaluation, currently, these appear most useful during outbreaks and as part of terminal cleaning in high intensity wards.
Measurement of adequacy of cleaning
Hospital cleaning has been impeded by the lack of established guidelines and standardised monitoring methods. Visual inspection of environmental cleanliness, though cheap and quick, is an unreliable indicator of microbial contamination. Other methods utilising fluorescent marker gels or adenosine triphosphate (ATP) bioluminescence assays can be used to assess thoroughness of cleaning. Performance measurement is an important aspect of feedback and education for cleaning staff and, though limited, these indices can provide useful assessment and motivational tools.
Support for cleaning staff
Manual environmental cleaning is the most important determinant of quality cleaning. 23, 37, 47 However, the completeness of physical cleaning is variable and dependent on staff performance. When measured, 50-60% of high touch surfaces that should be cleaned and disinfected are not. 47, 48 Initiatives including staff education, implementation of regular feedback and discussion of objective performance data, engender accountability and ownership and can result in improved standards. 38 Investment in cleaning staff as a valuable resource relies on the support of hospital executives. Time pressure, inadequate training and high staff turnover rates will, if unaddressed, undermine performance and MRO control. While manual cleaning alone was previously viewed to be a sufficient focus of environment management, it is now clear that educational interventions and staff motivation are key determinants of cleaning efficacy and HAI prevention. 37, 47 Other interventions to prevent HAI
The role of hand hygiene
Hand hygiene compliance is a fundamental principle of quality healthcare. While interventions are often multimodal, and direct causal benefits difficult to prove, there is substantial epidemiological evidence to support the role of hand hygiene in reducing HAI. 13, 49, 50 For example, between 2002-2013, the annual incidence of Australian hospital onset S. aureus bacteraemia (SAB) (MRSA and MSSA) decreased by 63% 13 and similar reductions have been demonstrated overseas. 51 These reductions in HAI have paralleled national initiatives resulting in widespread adoption of successful hand hygiene programmes. In Australia, there has been a stepwise increase in hand hygiene compliance, from a rate of 67% in 2010 to 84% in 2016. 52 Good hand hygiene is a core tenet in HAI prevention bundles and remains a principal metric of a hospital's safety and quality systems.
Contact precautions
Contact precautions require single-patient rooms, dedicated equipment and that HCW wear gowns and gloves for patient care. The optimal application of these additional precautions to reduce HAI is unresolved, particularly in relation to VRE. The use of gowns and gloves for each patient contact requires effort from the HCW, consumes large numbers of gloves and gowns, and incurs significant financial and environmental costs. Additionally, unintended detrimental impacts on patient care have been demonstrated. [53] [54] [55] No interventional study has compared MRSA or VRE acquisition rates with contact precautions versus standard precautions. Current data suggests if standard precautions are well adhered to, the incremental benefit of contact precautions is small. 56 It is not surprising then that there is marked variation in the utilisation of contact precautions for VRE colonised patients between institutions, with some hospitals having discontinued routine contact precautions for VRE and occasionally MRSA for non-critical wards. 56, 57 Nonetheless, the presence of VRE and MRSA in the hospital environment is problematic. Improving environmental cleaning, particularly in high-risk units, as a 'horizontal' approach that focuses prevention strategies and impacts on all environmental MRO, is likely a more effective measure to reduce MRO exposure.
Although there is controversy about the utility of contact precautions for VRE and, to a lesser degree, MRSA colonised patients, it is important that this is not generalised to other settings. For example, universal contact precautions may have a benefit in high risk units. One cluster-randomised trial in the ICU setting demonstrated a reduction in MRSA acquisition of 40% (compared with 15% in the control arm). 58 Expert consensus supports the use of contact precautions for patients with CDI, norovirus, respiratory viruses and some multi-resistant Gram-negative bacteria, particularly CPE.
Decolonisation and decontamination
S. aureus is part of the normal skin flora in up to one third of the population. Colonised patients undergoing surgery are more likely to develop surgical site infection (SSI). Patients are most commonly infected with the S. aureus strain colonising their skin; over 80% of bloodstream isolates match strains isolated from the patient's nares. 59 For high risk surgery, pre-operative decolonisation of MSSA and MRSA has resulted in reduced SSI. Variation in practice continues with some advocating targeted decolonisation following screening and others favouring universal decolonisation of all high risk surgical patients. [60] [61] [62] [63] Surgical units with high rates of MRSA should consider pre-operative screening for all patients to facilitate decolonisation and targeted surgical prophylaxis.
In high-risk units, including ICU and bone marrow transplant wards, universal patient chlorhexidine bathing has been shown to reduce HAI. There is heterogeneity in studies and the magnitude of this benefit is dependent on baseline rates of HAI. 64 There are insufficient data at present to extend this practice outside of critical care wards.
Although selective oropharyngeal decontamination and selective digestive decontamination of ICU patients has demonstrated a mortality benefit in some studies, these results should be interpreted with caution. In general, these studies have been conducted in settings with low MRO endemicity and few studies have employed sufficiently robust measures to monitor emerging resistance. There are ongoing Australian studies that may provide further clarity on this issue.
The bundles of care
"Bundles" of care provide a useful, organised and systematic means of preventing HAI. Infection prevention bundles, typically composed of three to five key evidence-based principles compiled into a checklist format, were first introduced in the ICU setting with considerable success in reducing central line infections. 4 The individual components are not new, but rather, reflect well established best practice. Strengths of bundles lie in the consistency of application of all components and rely on the simplicity and ease of implementation. They have proven to be acceptable, effective and sustainable in complex healthcare systems with success reported in managing CAUTI, ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) and SAB. 'Bundles' of care have become a core tool in HAI prevention. Where infections occur despite compliance with prevention bundles, it is important that appropriate investigations and feedback are undertaken.
Antimicrobial stewardship for infection prevention reduction of unnecessary use. 65 There is a causal relationship between antimicrobial use and antibiotic resistance. Up to 50% of antibiotic usage is either unnecessary or inappropriate. 66 Rates of antibiotic use correlate with increased rates of HAI, including CDI, and patients receiving any antibiotics are more receptive to MRO colonisation. The judicious use of antibiotics is the most modifiable factor in combating antibiotic resistance; AMS strategies must ensure the correct antibiotic is prescribed at the right time for the right diagnosis. 65, 67 AMS programmes have led to improved patient outcomes, less antimicrobial resistance and a reduction in adverse events, including CDI rates, antimicrobial toxicity and unnecessary costs. 68 The Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care introduced accreditation standards mandating Australian hospitals to have a sustainable AMS programme. 69 Tools, such as the National Antibiotic Prescribing Survey (NAPS) enable Australian hospitals to benchmark antibiotic usage. 70 To date, antibiotic pre-authorisation and restriction strategies, combined with prescriber education and audit and feedback cycles, have been the cornerstones of AMS. 65 However, there is a recognition that such labour-intensive interventions are difficult to sustain and vary in duration of effectiveness. Table 2 outlines measures used to implement AMS in hospital settings. 65 Individual attitudes to prescribing and resistance to AMS initiatives have behavioural and cultural foundations. 'Prescribing etiquette,' that is, the reluctance to contradict prescriptions of colleagues and an inclination to follow the precedent of senior staff, is an embedded determinant of prescribing. [71] [72] [73] Consequentially, an unquestioning approach takes precedence over adherence to existing antibiotics policies, guidelines and advice. Few junior doctors feel empowered to question prescribing they feel to be inappropriate. In keeping with this, junior doctors describe a diminished sense of personal responsibility for the antibiotic choice and few consider the resultant patient and societal harm. 73 Conversely, a major motivator of junior doctor prescribing is the avoidance of criticism and, as such, choosing broader antibiotic regimens are perceived to carry a lesser risk of reproach. 74 Current AMS programmes that target junior medical staff often fail to recognise the difficulties in challenging this ingrained cultural hierarchy. 71, 72, 74 As medical personnel value autonomy, 75 the success of AMS initiatives is maximised when developed within a framework of collaboration and collegiality. 76 Ultimately, for AMS to be effective, initiatives need the sustained endorsement of senior clinicians and engagement by the hospital leadership.
Conclusion
It is imperative that effective HAI management strategies are implemented in Australian hospitals and that HCW recognise the importance of their individual role in HAI prevention. The success of such strategies will require a cultural shift, emphasising both institutional and individual accountability, and engagement with guidelines that promote optimal infection control practices and the judicious use of antimicrobials. 
